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RECENT CASES
TORTS-A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION CANNOT BE
MAINTAINED FOR DEATH OF AN UNBORN FETUS AND
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM CANNOT BE ASSERTED WHEN DEATH OF FETUS IS HIDDEN FROM COMPLAINANT'S SENSORY AND CONTEMPORANEOUS PERCEPTION-Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d
564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
Two couples, Jeffrey and Linda Sue Justus and Robert and
Karen Powell, suffered the stillbirths of their children at the
Goleta Valley Hospital in California. In both instances, Dr.
Joseph Atchison was the attending physician, and in both instances, the husband was present during the delivery.
Each couple brought an action against the attending physician, the assisting physician, and the hospital for the wrongful death of their child allegedly caused by the defendants'
negligence and for shock allegedly experienced by the husband
in witnessing the stillbirth.'
At trial, the defendants' general demurrers were sustained
in each case on the two causes of action without leave to
amend. In both cases, the plaintiffs appealed from the trial
court's dismissal, and the appeals were ordered consolidated.
In dealing with the consolidated appeals, the California
Supreme Court confronted both issues made out by the demurrers: first, whether a stillborn fetus may maintain a cause of
action for wrongful death, and second, whether the husband/father may maintain a cause of action based on the emotional shock resulting from witnessing the stillbirth.
With respect to the first issue, the court began by answering the threshold question of whether or not a wrongful death
action in California is solely a creature of statute. In answering
this question in the affirmative, the court adopted the reasoning of Kramer v. Market Street Railroad Co.2 Basically,
Kramer determined that the wrongful death cause of action
was not recognized at common law, and thus could only be
1. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 567, 565 P.2d 122, 124, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97,
99 (1977). In addition, each complaint alleged causes of action on behalf of the
wives/mothers for personal injuries.
2. 25 Cal. 434 (1864).
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maintained if the legislature provided a wrongful death statute.'
Moreover, the court was persuaded that the general language of the wrongful death statute4 evinced a legislative intention to define the field of recovery for wrongful death, thereby
implicitly cutting off any judicial input on the issue.5
After deciding that the wrongful death action was purely
a creature of statute and that the terms of the statute controlled the right to recover, the court addressed the problem of
whether the legislature intended to encompass unborn fetuses
within the ambit of the statutory action. To settle this issue,
the supreme court focused on the word "personi" contained in
the wrongful death statute, Code of Civil Procedure section
377. The court looked to various sections of the Civil and Probate Codes' and found that an unborn fetus is deemed to be
an existing person in determining its interests only if it is subsequently born alive. Furthermore, the court pointed out that
when the legislature wanted to provide protection for an unborn child within a statute, it did so in specific terms.' Thus,
the court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include fetuses within the term "person" in section 377, it would
have done so expressly.
In analyzing the emotional shock cause of action, the court
looked to the language of its landmark decision in Dillon v.
Legg.' The Dillon court, in order to limit potentially "infinite
liability," listed three factors that had to be taken into account
before emotional shock could become a basis for recovery. The
listed factors were: 1) whether the plaintiff and the victim were
closely related; 2) whether plaintiff was present at the scene of
the accident; and 3) whether the shock resulted from a direct
emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence The
3.
4.

See 19 Cal. 3d at 573-75, 565 P.2d at 128-29, 139 Cal. Rptr. 102-03.
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act of neglect

of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may
maintain an action for damages against the person causing the
death. . ..
5. 19 Cal. 3d at 575, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
6. See 19 Cal. 3d at 578, 565 P.2d at 131, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (citing CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 29, 698, 739 (West 1954); CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 1956)).
7. 19 Cal. 3d at 578, 565 P.2d at 131, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
8. 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
9. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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court suggested that its guidelines were to be applied on a caseto-case basis in the future.' 0
Justus v. Atchison concentrated on the third requirement.
In applying this requirement to the facts, the court determined
that the husband's shock did not occur until he was actually
informed by the doctor that the fetus had died. "[L]earning
of the accident from others after its occurrence" was expressly
held not to support a cause of action in Dillon." Pointing out
that the death of the fetus was by its very nature hidden from
the husband's sensory and contemporaneous perception, the
court decided that the Dillon requirements were not met.
In reaching its conclusion that a stillborn fetus cannot
maintain a wrongful death action within the terms of Civil
Code section 377, the Justus court acknowledged that a fetus
may be treated like a person for some purposes but not for
others. The fetus status as a person depends on the intent of
the legislature at the time it created the statutory right. Apparently, this intent controls regardless of judicial developments
in the meantime. As Justice Tobriner noted in his concurring
opinion, the court's reliance on the intent of the legislature
enabled it to avoid "a difficult policy choice."'" He found nothing in section 377 or its legislative history which "precluded"
further judicial development of the class of individuals who
might recover under the statute. However, Tobriner offered
another rationale for limiting recovery. Relying on the court's
opinion in Borer v. American Airlines,'3 he argued "that [the
court] should not recognize a new cause of action for the
wrongful death of a fetus," because it is "a wholly intangible
injury to plaintiffs for which any monetary recovery can provide no real compensation. .... ,

The Justus court's analysis of the negligent infliction of
emotional shock issue demonstrates the difficulty of applying
the guidelines suggested in Dillon to cases in which the facts
are more subtle. The supreme court construed the sensory and
contemporaneous perception factor very narrowly. It emphasized the fact that the husband obtained only second hand
knowledge of the injury. However, the death of a fetus inside
10.
11.

Id.
Id.

12. 19 Cal. 3d at 586, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (Tobriner, J.,
concurring).
13. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
14. 19 Cal. 3d at 586, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
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the mother's womb is by its very nature beyond someone's
actual perception, whereas an accident involving a car (as in
Dillon) is much more likely to be within it. Thus, Justus seems
to indicate that in the absence of actual perception of the injury, recovery for emotional shock will not be available.
Following close on the heels of Borer, Justus v. Atchison
supplies further evidence that the California Supreme Court is
attempting to sharply limit those fact patterns which will generate recovery for nonphysical injuries.
Laurie Moe

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TIME, PLACE AND MANNER
REGULATION OF NEWSRACKS WHICH PRESCRIBES
SUMMARY SEIZURE PROCEDURES VIOLATES BOTH
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DUE PROCESS RIGHTS-Kash
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 562
P.2d 1302, 138 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1977).
In 1972 the city of Los Angeles enacted a municipal ordinance which regulated the size, weight, appearance and placement of newsracks installed and maintained on the city's sidewalks.' After a number of newsracks had been removed from
their sidewalk locations pursuant to the provisions of the ordinance, Kash Enterprises (Kash), a corporation engaged in the
publication and distribution of newspapers, instituted an action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
At the hearing on Kash's motion for the preliminary injunction, Kash contended that the provisions of the ordinance
were unconstitutional both as written and as enforced. Despite
this challenge, the superior court denied the motion.
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, Kash again
maintained that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face
in two respects. First, Kash asserted that the ordinance's substantive provisions were so vague and overbroad as to impermissibly infringe on its first amendment rights. Second, Kash
argued that the ordinance's summary enforcement procedures
were violative of due process, since they did not include a hearing to determine the validity of the seizure.
Responding to these two attacks, the supreme court upheld the substantive provisions of the ordinance but found that
the trial court erred in refusing to enjoin the city from acting
pursuant to that portion of the ordinance which authorized the
seizure, retention and destruction of newsracks.
In considering the substantive challenge to the ordinance,
the supreme court initially established that a newsrack, because of its communicative nature, fell within the free speech
and press protections of the first amendment. However, the
court noted that simply because it fell within the ambit of the
first amendment, a newsrack is not totally immune from regulation by local municipalities. Specifically, it asserted that regulations as to the time, place and manner of newsracks were
permissible if narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary infringement and reasonably supported by valid municipal interests.
1.

Los ANGEI.,

CAL., MuNicPAL CODE § 42.00(f)(1)-(6) (19"72).
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Based on this conceptual framework, the court concluded
that a municipal ordinance prohibiting newsracks in an area
which would "unreasonably interfere with or impede" ' pedestrian or vehicular traffic was not unduly vague and the terms
were susceptible to common understanding;' that the requirement for placement of newsracks so as not to interfere with
sidewalk cleaning was reasonably based on a city interest in
cleanliness;' and that the restriction that newsracks should
not be placed within three feet of "any areas improved with
lawn, flowers, shrubs or trees" 5 was acceptable as a valid interest in maintaining greenery in an urban environment.
Additionally, the court cautioned that such limitations
were valid only so long as the provisions did not unduly restrict
the use of newsracks. The court determined the only doubtful
language of the ordinance was "attractive" and construed this
potentially vague aesthetic standard as meaning "neat and
clean," preserving the constitutionality of the legislation. Thus
the court held that the substantive provisions of the ordinance
were sufficiently definite and narrowly drawn to avoid vagueness and any unnecessary infringement of first amendment
rights.'
The court reached a contrary conclusion when analyzing
the ordinance's procedure for seizing newsracks.7 It determined
2.

Id. § 42.00 (0(2).

3. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court's rejection of an almost
identical vagueness attack in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968). See Kash
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 303-04, 562 P.2d 1302, 1308,
138 Cal. Rptr. 53, 59 (1977).
4. The court rejected Kash's argument that the ordinance was sacrificing first
amendment rights in favor of a "mechanically clean" sidewalk by interpreting that
portion of the ordinance to merely require more reasonable placement and design of
newsracks so as to minimize interference with the city's mechanical sidewalk cleaners.
19 Cal. 3d at 304, 562 P.2d at 1308, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
5. Los ANOKIZS, CAL. MuNiciPAL CODE § 42.00(f)(3)(F)(8) (1972).
6. 19 Cal. 3d at 305-06, 562 P.2d at 1309, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
7. Under the general provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, a newsrack
owner who violated any of the provisions of the ordinance was guilty of a misdemeanor,
punishable by up to a $500 fine or six months imprisonment. Los ANGELES, CAL.
MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.00(m).

In addition to the criminal penalty, the ordinance authorized a public officer to
remove any newsrack which the officer subjectively believed to be in violation of the
ordinance's size, weight, appearance or location restrictions without prior notice to the
owner. Id. § 42.00 (0(5). There was no provision for a hearing on the merits of the
removal at any time. After seizure of the newsrack and upon notification, the owner
had to claim the newsrack within 45 days and pay costs of removal as determined by
the Board of Public Work Commissioners (at the time of the hearing, the city was
charging $25 for each newsrack removed) or the newsrack would be treated as abandoned and thus destroyed.
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that these provisions violated both the property owner's procedural rights to due process and the public's first amendment
right of access to protected expression. The ordinance's provisions for summary seizure provided no opportunity for a hearing on the merits either before or after the taking. Without
them, the court reasoned that the ordinance could not pass the
constitutional right to due process when there is a deprivation
of property.'
Although city officials sometimes gave a warning before
seizing the newsracks, the court determined that such a procedure must be consistently applied to satisfy due process, and
that notice by mere chance did not meet constitutional standards. Furthermore, the court noted that the availability of a
collateral judicial procedure to recover the property is not an
adequate substitute for a hearing, especially when the procedure would place an added financial burden on the party whose
property was taken.'
The public's first amendment "due process" rights" were
equally important to the court's determination that the procedural provisions were constitutionally deficient. Since it permitted blanket seizure of the newsracks and all material in
them, the ordinance failed to meet the constitutional requirement that a regulation of protected expression be narrowly
drafted to avoid unnecessary infringement with the first
amendment. The court found this impermissible level of arbitrary suppression in the ordinance's provisions that enabled a
public officer to make a subjective determination of violations
and to seize a newsrack for any violation. Such a provision
permitted the official to suppress any newspapers in the newsracks, and although only temporary, resulted in the censoring
of newsworthy information."
Kash is significant because the court emphasizes that the
due process clause protects an individual from seizure of his
property irrespective of how deminimus or temporary the tak8. 19 Cal. 3d at 306-07, 562 P.2d at 1310, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
9. Id. at 308-09, 562 P.2d at 1310-11, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 61-62.
10. The concept of first amendment due process is not a new one. While it has
traditionally been applied in the obscenity area, the Supreme Court has established a
set of specific rules to prevent insensitive procedural devices from strangling first
amendment interests. Essentially, under the fourteenth amendment a state cannot
adopt whatever procedures it desires in enforcing its laws without considering the
potential effects on constitutionally protected speech. Thus, first amendment due
process is essentially a body of procedural law created by the courts which delineates
how the courts and governmental agencies must evaluate and resolve first amendment
claims.
11. 19 Cal. 3d at 310-13, 562 P.2d at 1312-14, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 63-65.
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ing. Absent an emergency situation, due process requires that
when a state seeks to deprive the owner of his property, it must
afford notice and opportunity for hearing. Even in emergencies,
the opportunity to be heard may only be postponed and not
eliminated.
Kash also expresses a concern for the procedures to enforce
an otherwise valid regulation which involves a first amendment
right. The court attempts to clarify what a municipality may
constitutionally do to minimize interference with the public's
rights. In the event of danger to pedestrians or vehicles, a newsrack may summarily be seized without notice or hearing. In the
absence of any danger, a newsrack which violates the ordinance
may be seized provided the owner is notified of the impending
seizure and given a reasonable opportunity to correct the violation or object to the seizure in an informal administrative
forum. The court proposes another less intrusive alternative by
means of fines, thereby giving the owner an incentive to comply
with the regulations.
The inclusion of newsracks under the protective umbrella
of the first amendment indicates the court's recognition that
the distribution of newspapers and periodicals on the public
streets is deeply rooted in the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The procedural guarantees are held to be equally as important as the substantive
guarantees of the Constitution where sensitive first amendment rights are involved.
Randy Iris Danto

SECURED TRANSACTIONS-SECURED PARTY WHO
ACCEPTS COLLATERAL IS LIABLE IN CONVERSION
FOR THE WRONGFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY BY AN
INDEPENDENT LICENSED REPOSSESSOR- Henderson
v. Security National Bank, 72 Cal. App. 3d 764, 140 Cal. Rptr.
388 (1977).
Willie C. Henderson defaulted on his automobile financing
contract with Security National Bank (the Bank). Since the
Bank had retained a security interest in the car, it hired a
licensed repossessor,' an independent contractor, to take possession of the collateral.' Following repossession and the Bank's
sale of the automobile, Henderson commenced an action in
trespass and conversion against the Bank and the repossessor,
seeking compensatory and exemplary damages. He contended
that in the process of taking the collateral the repossessor broke
the lock of his garage door, and that the Bank either expressly
or impliedly authorized or ratified this act.
Henderson settled with the professional repossessor prior
At the trial the Bank was granted a judgment of nontrial.
to
suit on the trespass cause of action. Thus, only the issue of
conversion went to the jury. When a verdict was returned
against the Bank, Henderson was awarded both compensatory
and exemplary damages. The trial court, on the Bank's motion,
entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and an order for
a new trial on grounds of insufficiency of evidence and errors
in law, which was to become effective if the judgment notwithstanding the verdict was reversed on appeal. However, the filing of the specification of reasons for granting the new trial was
not timely.3 Henderson appealed from the judgment of nonsuit,
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the order for a
new trial.
The court of appeal affirmed the judgment of nonsuit on
the trespass action.' It also affirmed the judgment notwith1. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7520, 7526 (West 1954).
2. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9503 (West 1964).
3. California Code of Civil Procedure § 657 requires that the specification of
reasons for granting a new trial be filed within 10 days after the filing of the order. In
this instance, the lower court filed its specification of reasons 12 days after the filing
of its order. Thus, the court of appeal summarily reversed the order granting the new
trial. Henderson v. Security National Bank, 72 Cal. App. 3d 764, 775-76, 140 Cal. Rptr.
388, 394 (1977).
4. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment of nonsuit on the trespass cause
of action, because Henderson failed to make any contention in support of his appeal

from the nonsuit. Therefore, the court of appeal deemed the appeal on this issue
unmeritorious, and adopted the lower court's findings on the trespass cause. Id. at 769,
140 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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standing the verdict on the conversion action, insofar as exemplary damages were denied,' but it reversed that part of the
judment notwithstanding the verdict that denied compensatory damages. The court concluded that the Bank was liable
in conversion for the wrongful taking of the collateral by the
independent licensed repossessor.
In rendering its decision, the appellate court in essence
determined the nature of a secured creditor's liability for an
independent repossessor's failure to follow the statutory procedure in taking possession of the collateral. California decisional
law prior to Henderson v. Security National Bank had never
dealt with this aspect of self-help repossession under the California Commercial Code.'
The foundation for holding the Bank liable in conversion
follows from the trial court's finding that the professional repossessor unlawfully broke the garage lock to take possession
of the collateral. A secured party's right of self-help repossession on default of the debtor is provided for in California Commercial Code Section 9503.1 This right to take possession without judicial process is conditioned on the ability of the secured
party to take possession without engendering a breach of the
peace. The appellate court reasoned that this unlawful breaking and entering constituted a breach of the peace in violation
of section 9503.
After concluding that the repossessor had unlawfully
breached the peace in taking the collateral, the court of appeal
determined that such a breach gives rise to a conversion cause
of action against those who subsequently obtain possession of
the collateral from the repossessor. The court's determination
stemmed from the nature of the conversion cause of action.
Conversion is any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his
rights in the property. 8 Because the mere act of wrongfully
5. The appellate court affirmed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
conversion cause of action, insofar as exemplary damages were denied, on the basis
that there was no evidence of a substantial nature supportive of the jury's award. The
award lacked the requisite finding of an intent to injure Henderson. Id. at 769, 140 Cal.
Rptr. at 390-91.
6. CAL. COM. CODE §§ 9101-9507 (West 1964).
7. CAL. COM. CODE §§ 9503 (West 1964) provides in relevant part: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral.
In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can
be done without breach of the peace . .. ."

8. See Culp v. Signal Van & Storage, 142 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856, 862, 298 P.2d
162, 164 (1956).
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interfering with another's property gives rise to a claim of conversion,' it was of no consequence under the facts of Henderson
that the repossessor was an independent contractor. The liability of the Bank proceeded from its own acts in holding and
disposing of the collateral.
Whether a taking of collateral in violation of section 9503
resulted in a conversion was an issue of first impression for the
court of appeal. In resolving it the court looked to out-of-state
authorities."0 These authorities, with one exception," held that
a conversion occurred when the initial right of self-help repossession was abused by the repossessor's breach of the peace.
The Henderson court adopted the rule in these cases. The
self-help right of peaceable repossession enjoyed by the secured
party on default does not excuse a tortious repossession involving force, threats, fear or other acts constituting a breach of the
2
peace.
Thus, the Bank itself could not assert rightful possession
under section 9503, on the basis that the initial right of selfhelp repossession was wrongfully exercised. The Bank's liability followed when it denied Henderson the automobile and subsequently sold it to satisfy the debt owing.
In defining a secured party's liability for an independent
repossessor's breach of the peace, Henderson underscores the
importance of following the self-help provision of section 9503.
Its holding accords with the scheme of the California Commercial Code, which gives personal rights priority without reference to the location of title to the collateral. 3 In this regard, it
contravenes the early pre-Code case of Silverstin v. Kohler &
Chase." There the California Supreme Court held that where
one is entitled to repossess himself of property, even a forcible
repossession could not amount to a conversion, although there
may be liability for an assault and battery or trespass.
Thus, in order to effect a self-help repossession free of lia9. See Byer v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 8 Cal. 2d 297, 65 P.2d 67 (1937).
10. See Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 324 F. Supp. 108 (D.S.C. 1971);
Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976; 341 S.W.2d 765 (1961); Thrasher v.

First National Bank of Miami, 288 So. 2d 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Douglas
Motor Co. v. Watson, 22 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. Ct. App. 1942); A.B. Lewis Co. v. Robinson,
339 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
11. Victor v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 8 So. 2d 566 (La. Ct. of App. 1942) (Louisiana denies creditors the right to self-help repossession).
12. See A.B. Lewis Co. v. Robinson, 339 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
13. CAL. COM. CODE § 9202 (West 1964).
14. 181 Cal. 51, 183 P. 451 (1919).
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bility in conversion, a secured party must carefully review the
conduct of the repossessor prior to taking possession of the
collateral, notwithstanding the independent nature of the relationship. Without knowledge of misconduct during repossession, the secured party accepts the collateral with the intent to
discharge the debt by redemption or sale. With knowledge of
misconduct, it can avoid liability by rejecting delivery of the
collateral, since in this manner it does not exercise dominion
over the property.'5
However, it remains for future cases to clarify what alternative measures there are for a secured party who wishes to
protect the collateral from further acts of the repossessor. Ostensibly, one possibility is to bail the property on account of the
debtor.' Yet, short of rejecting delivery of the collateral, it is
an issue whether even some dominion on account of the debtor
can limit the liability in conversion that flows from the initial
breach of the peace committed by the repossessor in taking
possession of the collateral.
J. Enrique Rey
15. See King v. Hercules Powder Co., 39 Cal. App. 223, 178 P. 531 (1918).
16. Henderson seems to preclude liability in conversion for such bailment, if it
can be shown that the secured party did not exercise dominion over the property to
the exclusion of the debtor. Cf. Atkinson v. Charles Nelson Co., 41 Cal. App. 304, 182
P. 759 (1919) (merely designating a third party to receive the property is insufficient).

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS-LAW REQUIRING FAVORABLE TWO-THIRDS VOTE TO CHANGE GENERAL LAW
CITY'S NAME DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES- Coffineau v. Fong Eu, 68 Cal. App.
3d 138, 137 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1977).
In 1974, the City of Rancho Palos Verdes held an election
in which approximately sixty-four percent of the electorate
voted for a ballot measure to change the municipality's name
to The City of Palos Verdes. California Government Code section 34507' requires a two-thirds majority for a general law city
such as Rancho Palos Verdes to change its name. The city
attempted to record the change of name following statutory
procedures, 2 but both California state officials and the Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors refused to accept the
election results as sufficient to record the change.
Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate to compel the city,
Board of Supervisors, County Recorder, and Secretary of
State to take the necessary steps to effect the change in name.
In analyzing the request for the writ, the superior court observed that the voters in a chartered city are able to change
their city's name by a simple majority vote. As a result, it
found that section 34507 was unconstitutional because it denied general law cities and their electorates equal protection
of the law. Based on this finding, the court issued a peremptory writ commanding the defendants to require only a simple
majority vote to accomplish a change in the city's name.'
In ruling on the constitutionality of section 34507, the
court of appeal was forced to consider whether or not the statute, by requiring a two-thirds favorable vote, impermissibly
distinguished between general law and chartered cities, and
thus discriminated against an identifiable class of citizens by
infringing on their fundamental right to vote.' The appellate
1. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 34507 (West 1968).
2. Section 34507 provides:
If two-thirds of the total votes cast at the election are in favor of the
proposed change of name, the legislative body shall file a statement of
the holding of the election and the result with the Secretary of State and
with the board of supervisors of the county in which the city is situated.
From the date of filing, the name is changed.
Id.
3. Coffineau v. Fong Eu, 68 Cal. App. 3d 138, 141, 137 Cal. Rptr. 90, 92 (1977).
4. The courts have established that a citizen has a constitutionally protected
right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964).

1095

1096

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

court concluded that there is no constitutional proscription
against a requirement of more than a majority vote to carry a
ballot measure in general law cities.
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeal initially
noted that the California Constitution provides for the existence of two distinct classes of cities-chartered cities and general law cities. Under the California Constitution, chartered
cities are empowered to "make and enforce all ordinances and
regulations in respect to municipal affairs." ' 5 Thus, a chartered
city may exercise "full control over its municipal affairs unaffected by general laws on the same subject matters."' On the
other hand, general law cities have only those powers conferred
upon them by the Legislature. The powers of such cities are
strictly construed so that any doubt concerning the exercise of
a power is resolved against the city.' Unlike chartered cities,
then, general law cities are constrained to follow state regulations even on purely municipal matters.
After drawing this distinction, the appellate court focused
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gordon v.
Lance,8 which recognized the propriety of requiring more than
a majority vote in elections dealing with certain municipal affairs. In this regard the Supreme Court noted: "Certainly any
departure from strict majority rule gives disproportionate
power to the minority. But there is nothing in the language of
the Constitution, our history, or our cases that requires that a
majority always prevail on every issue."' The Court in Gordon
further pointed out that unless the provision discriminated
against an identifiable class, the statute did not violate equal
protection guarantees."0
Relying on Gordon, the court then looked at section 34507
to determine if its two-thirds vote requirement infringed upon
the fundamental voting rights of an identifiable class of citizens. The court summarily concluded such rights were not infringed, noting that the California Constitution recognizes the
validity of requiring more than a majority vote in an appropriate situation."
5. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 5.
6. See Riviera v. City of Fresno, 6 Cal. 3d 132,135, 490 P.2d 793, 794, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 282 (1971).
7. See Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, 65 Cal. 2d 13, 20, 415 P.2d 769,773, 51
Cal. Rptr. 881,885 (1966).
8. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
9. Id.at 5.
10. Id.at 7.
11. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 143, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
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Since no fundamental rights were violated, the court
tested the constitutional validity of the statute against the
"rational basis" standard. 2 It noted that the change of a city's
name is a matter of serious consequence and is not to be lightly
or frequently undertaken. The requirement of a two-thirds favorable vote prevents the frequent name changes that might
result in case of shifts of opinion on the part of a comparatively
small number of voters. Thus, the court reasoned the twothirds vote requirement is not arbitrary but bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose because a "set of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it."'"
The court further noted that although section 34507 is not
applicable to all cities, the distinction is not arbitrarily made.
City elections are purely municipal affairs and in chartered
cities the applicable charter provisions prevail over section
34507. However, in the case of general law cities, it is within
the province of the Legislature to regulate municipal elections.
Since section 34507 is uniformly applied to all general law cities
and furthers a legitimate state purpose, the court found the
statute does not violate equal protection rights.
Coffineau v. Fong Eu demonstrates that in areas where
states have general competence to act, the courts have recognized that states have broad powers to formulate voting requirements. Equal protection guarantees have been limited to
two basic areas where voting rights are concerned. First, the
"one-man, one-vote" doctrine has been applied to matters of
legislative representation. Beginning with Baker v. Carr," the
United States Supreme Court has held that under a representative form of government, each citizen's vote must be weighted
equally with the vote of other citizens in matters of legislative
representation.
Secondly, voting requirements which discriminate against
an identifiable class of citizens may violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the regulations are based upon a compelling
state interest. 5 In other local matters, states have exercised
broad regulatory powers over voting requirements. Justice
12. See Weber v. City Council, 9 Cal. 3d 950, 958, 513 P.2d. 601, 606, 109
Cal.Rptr. 553, 558 (1973).
13. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 145, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (quoting Estate of Horman, 5
Cal. 3d 62, 75, 485 P.2d 785, 794, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1971)).
14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), where the Supreme Court
held registration requirements based on duration of residency violated equal protection
rights because other adequate means of ascertaining residency were available.
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Black has noted: "[tihe equal protection cases carefully analyzed boil down to the principle that distinctions drawn and
even discriminations imposed by state laws do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause so long as these distinctions and discriminations are not 'irrational,' 'irrelevant,' 'unreasonable,'
'arbitrary,' or 'invidious.' "Is

Coffineau indicates that whenever the court can find a
rational relation to a legitimate state purpose-an extremely
lenient standard-the state may vest in a minority of voters an
inordinate power to maintain the status quo. The extent of the
state's power to affect voting rights in this manner is still uncertain. Coffineau validiated a two-thirds requirement to
change a city's name. It must be left for future cases to determine whether more important ballot measures and more severe
percentage requirements fall within the state's regulatory
power.
Peter Greenwald
16. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting).

ENVIRONMENT-AN ENVIRONMENT IMPACT REPORT IS INSUFFICIENT IF PROJECT DEFINITION VARIES OR IS INACCURATE OR THERE IS FAILURE TO
PRESENT TRUE PROJECT ALTERNATIVES-County of
Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 139 Cal. Rptr.
396 (1977).
In 1973 the Third District Court of Appeal, at the instance
of Inyo County, issued a writ of mandate ordering the City of
Los Angeles to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR)'
on the city's extraction of subsurface water in Owens Valley.'
Three years later the city returned the writ and submitted the
EIR, which had been approved by the Los Angeles Board of
Water and Power Commissioners. Inyo County objected to the
return on the grounds that the EIR failed to comply with the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).
In County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, the court of
appeal sustained the county's objection and rejected the EIR
on the grounds that it was inadequate in its treatment of project definition and project alternatives.The court however, refused to evaluate the sufficiency of the EIR's assessment of
advese effects potentially resulting from the project.
In reviewing the EIR, the appellate court focused principally on the accuracy of the project description. The court
1. Environmental impact reports (EIR) are mandated under the California Environmenal Quality Act, CAL. Pus. Rxs. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977), which directs

local and state government agencies to prepare and certify completion of an EIR on
any project they intend to conduct or approve which may have a significant impact
on the environment. Generally, an EIR describes a project, assesses its potential impact on the environment, evaluates alternatives to the project, and offers recommendations as to whether the project should be carried out, mitigation measures be adopted,
an alternative be adopted, or the project be abandoned. A draft version of the EIR is
made available to the public and concerned government agencies for comment. The
final EIR is supposed to address comments received from the agencies and the public.
The final EIR then becomes the basis for administrative decisions regarding the proposed project.
2. Owens Valley is a 3000 square mile area in Inyo and Mono Counties that
receives substantial spring run-off from the melting snowpack of the Sierra Nevada.
Shortly after 1900, the City of Los Angeles began to acquire water rights and land
throughout the valley. The City's subsequent control and exportation of water in
Owens Valley has been the center of controversy for over 60 years. By 1973, when the
suit in question commenced, 97 percent of all privately owned land in the valley was
owned by the City. To transport surface water from the valley to Los Angeles, the City
constructed an aqueduct in 1913. Since that time, the City has entered upon a supplementary program of ground water extraction. To transport this additional water, the
City constructed a second aqueduct in 1970. At the same time, the City sought to
increase ground water extraction in accordance with its plans for the second aqueduct,
thus prompting Inyo County to initiate litigation on the necessity of an EIR. County
of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).
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noted that the EIR discussed both an officially designated project and a "recommended project." The formally designated
project, as described in the EIR, would consist of an increase
of 51 cubic feet per second in groundwater pumping, with the
additional water to be used within Owens Valley on lands
owned by the City of Los Angeles. The "recommended project"
discussed elsewhere in the EIR would be far broader in scope.
As approved by the Los Angeles Board of Water and Power
Commissioners, the "recommended project" in the EIR would
include increased exporting of water from Owens Valley to Los
Angeles in wet years, construction of a pipeline in the San
Fernando Valley to permit underground storage of Owens Valley water in wet years, concrete lining of two canals in Owens
Valley to reduce percolation into the groundwater basin, and
reduction of stock water in Owens Valley by almost two-thirds.
Terming a precise project description "the sine qua non"
of a legally sufficient EIR, the appellate court concluded that
this wide variance in project description defeated the purpose
of an EIR in two ways. First, the court reasoned that the document failed in its role as an informational document for decisionmaking by officials. The court emphasized that only
through an accurate project description can decisionmakers
weigh the benefits of a project against its adverse effects and
properly consider mitigation measures or cancellation of the
project.'
Second, the court maintained that the EIR, through its
variance in project description, failed in its role as an informational document for the public. Noting that one of the objectives of CEQA is to encourage intelligent public comment on
proposed projects, the court labelled the confused project definition "a red herring across the path of public input."4
In addition to thwarting the informational purpose of an
EIR, the court of appeal noted that the varying project descriptions also had the effect, the court noted, of making the EIR a
vehicle for official approval by the Los Angeles Board of Water
and Power of a broad water management program far exceeding the narrow groundwater increase described in the formal
project definition. The court chastised the City of Los Angeles
for using the narrower project as the "launching pad" for a far
3. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 192-93, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 396, 401 (1977).
4. Id. at 197-98, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 405.

1978]

COUNTY OF INYO v. L.A.

1101

broader proposal.'
Finally, the court also concluded that the EIR's varying
project descriptions were insufficient in their failure to define
the project in accordance with the findings in the earlier decision of County of Inyo v. Yorty. In that decision the appellate court ordered an EIR directed at Los Angeles' total
ground-water extraction activities in the valley. The resulting
EIR, under discussion here, contravened the prior court's
order by defining the project under evaluation as consisting
solely of a 51 cubic feet per second increase in water extraction
without regard for the amount already being extracted by the
city. Within the EIR, the city contended that the court had
not clearly stated what amount of extraction activity was to be
evaluated, but the court rejected this argument, noting that
Los Angeles had three years in which to seek clarification from
the court.7
The inadequacy of project description also laid the groundwork for what the court found to be the second major area of
inadequacy in the EIR: the treatment of project alternatives.
Under CEQA an EIR must address all reasonable project alternatives and include the alternative of "no project." Because
the official project definition offered by the City was substantially narrower than that enunciated by the court in County of
Inyo v. Yorty, the alternatives to the project as defined by Los
Angeles were not alternatives to what the court held to be the
actual project at hand.'
In addition to this basic flaw, the court found that the
alternatives discussed in the EIR failed to include a "no project" alternative as required by CEQA. The proposal labeled
by Los Angeles as "no project" was viewed by the court as
failing of that purpose by excluding an accurate picture of preproject conditions. Under the purported "no project" alternatives the city would reduce irrigated acreage within the valley
to less than one-tenth the present acreage and severely reduce
the existing local cattle industry. Since the project as officially
defined by the city was to meet needs "not anticipated" in
earlier planning for water use within the valley, the court found
it unacceptable that the purported "no project" alternative
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 199-200, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).
71 Cal. App. 3d at 202-03, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
Id. at 203, 139 Cal. Rptr. 408.
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would deny water to anticipated uses.'
In concluding its review of the project alternatives the
court noted that the City had failed to consider an "obvious"
alternative: an effective plan for achieving water conservation
in Los Angeles. The omission of an obvious alternative, the
court stated, alone cast doubt upon the EIR's sufficiency.
In addition to the project description and project alternative questions a third aspect of the EIR at issue was the sufficiency of the assessment of potential environmental damage
that might result from the project. Although the official project
designation was restricted to a 51 cubic feet per second increase, the EIR's assessment of potential environmental effect
was directed at the broader "recommended project." In response to the argument that even this broader assessment
failed to adequately portray the potential adverse environmental effects, the court pointed out that conflicting expert testimony had been offered by opposing sides. Since the reviewing
agency had made favorable findings after analyzing this testimony, the court refused to rule on the adequacy of the EIR in
this area. It viewed the reevaluation of the EIR's environmental conclusions as a task beyond the competency and function
of a court.'"
County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles is one of the few
reported cases under CEQA in which an EIR has been found
to be deficient in substance." The general trend has been for
courts to construe the substantial evidence rule imposed by
CEQA as strictly limiting judicial review to the question of
whether evidence existed in the record to support the findings
of an administrative body on the sufficiency of an EIR.'2
In assessing the EIR presented by the City of Los Angeles,
the court expanded this previously narrow approach and evaluated the accuracy of the contents of the EIR. Significantly, the
court's willingness to go this far in its review probably can be
attributed to the fact that it had previously, in County of Inyo
v. Yorty, ordered the EIR initially and set guidelines defining
the scope of the project to be evaluated.
9. Id. at 202, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 407
10. Id. at 197, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
11. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Coastaide County Water Dist., 27 Cal.
App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972).
12. See, e.g., San Francisco Ecology Center v. City & County of San Francisco,
48 Cal. App. 3d 584, 122 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1975); Plan for Arcadia v. City Council of
Arcadia, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712, 117 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1974).
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Significantly, in the area of adverse environmental effects
where the court was confronted by the expert-versus-expert
controversy over potential environmental damage, the court
followed the traditional approach and refused to pass upon the
correctness of the information contained in the EIR. The reluctance of the court to make findings in this area indicates a
belief by the courts that they are not equipped to determine
which expert is more credible when controversy arises concerning potential negative effects on the environment. If this reluctance persists, opponents of a proposed project must persuade
the reviewing agency that the project will produce significant
adverse environmental effects. If they are unsuccessful at this
level, the agency finding in this area may be attacked only with
great difficulty in a later court review of the EIR should the
present attitude of the courts persist.
Finally, County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles may also be
significant insofar as the court evaluated the project alternatives with considerable specificity. This analysis may provide
useful standards as to what constitutes sufficiency in an EIR
with respect to presentation of project alternatives, and may
signal a warning to preparing agencies that they pay close attention to the accuracy of this part of an EIR so it will withstand this newly clarified standard of review.
Dorothy Gray

DUE PROCESS: A COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ALERT
A PROBATIONER TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF ADMITTING VIOLATIONS AT A PROBATION REVOCATION
HEARING. People v. Garcia, 67 Cal. App. 3d 134, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (1977).
On March 16, 1976, following a plea of guilty before the
Superior Court of Los Angeles to a charge of selling heroin,' the
proceedings against the defendant Garcia were suspended and
he was placed on probation for three years. One condition of
the probation was that Garcia participate in a drug treatment
program at Metropolitan State Hospital. He was not to leave
the program without the permission of both the hospital staff
and his probation officer. Garcia left the hospital on March 26.
It was determined four days later by urinalysis that he had
injested illegal narcotics.
On April 28, a Probation Revocation Hearing was held.
Garcia was provided with counsel, informed of his rights to a
hearing, to confront and to cross-examine adverse witnesses, to
present evidence, and to use the subpoena power of the court.
The probation officer's report presented at the hearing outlined
the facts of Garcia's case and recommended that probation be
revoked and sentence be imposed. After consulting with his
client, counsel informed the court that Garcia admitted the
violations. On May 12, after a review of the case, the superior
court revoked probation and sentenced Garcia.
Garcia appealed,2 asking the court to rule that due process
required a court in a probation revocation hearing to explain,
before a probationer admitted a violation of a condition of probation, the penal consequences of such an admission. The court
of appeal refused to accept this proposed expansion of due
process and affirmed the superior court's imposition of sentence.
In arguing for the extension of due process, Garcia maintained that his revocation hearing did not conform to the due
process standards established in People v. Vickers.3 Vickers
held that the minimum due process requirements for a probation revocation hearing are:
1.
2.

CAL. HEALTH & SArY CODE § 11352(a) (West 1975).
People v. Garcia, 67 Cal. App. 3d 134, 136 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1977).

3. 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972) (modified on rehearing,
Jan. 24, 1973).
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a) Written Notice of claimed violations.
b) Disclosure of evidence against him.
c) Opportunity to be hard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence.
d) Right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
e) Neutral and detached hearing body.
f) Written statement of the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revocation. 4
Vickers, however, did not address the issue of a defendant conceding a violation of probation at a probation revocation hearing. Garcia sought to broaden its scope to include such a case
by analogy to the due process required in a criminal trial on the
original charge. Recent cases have held that before a guilty plea
may be heard, a court in a criminal trial must make certain
that the record shows that the accused person understood the
nature of the charges and the possible penal consequences of a
guilty plea. 5 The record must also clearly indicate voluntariness on the part of the defendant in entering a plea.'
The court responded to these arguments by underscoring
the difference between a criminal trial and a probation revocation hearing. A criminal trial requires a finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt before a defendant can be convicted. A
court in a probation revocation hearing may decide to terminate probation if "the interests of justice so require and the
court has reason to believe . . .that the person has violated
any of the conditions of probation." 7 This standard of proof is
not as strict as "beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Another distinction is that there is usually no issue of guilt
or innocence at a probation revocation hearing because this
question can be determined beforehand on the basis of the
probation officer's report.' Hence, the function of the hearing
is usually not to establish guilt or innocence, but rather to
decide the fate of a person who has violated probation.'I Thus,
the court summarized the effect of Garcia's admission: "[bly
4. Id. at 458, 503 P.2d at 1318, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
5. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d
449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911 (1970) (modified on denial of
rehearing,Dec. 10, 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911 (1970).
6. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West 1970).
8. See In re Coughlin, 16 Cal. 3d 52, 545 P.2d 249, 127 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1976).
9. A court in a probation revocation hearing may draw its conclusion "from the
report of the Probation Officer or otherwise." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West 1970).
10. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 399-400.
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admitting what has already been proved, he gave up nothing
of substance.""
People v. Garcia does not establish that a probationer's
guilt or innocence of a violation is determined solely by a probation officer's report in all cases. The language of the relevant
statute 2 and of this decision 3 indicate that other factors may
be involved. In a different case, questions of guilt may remain
for determination at the hearing on the basis of other evidence
and an uninformed admission by a probationer could be found
to amount to an involuntary surrender of substantial rights. In
Garcia, however, as in most cases,'" the probation officer's report contained solid evidence which was sufficient by itself to
establish the alleged violations. 5
Furthermore, neither Garcia nor his appointed counsel
suggested that Garcia was uninformed in any material way. As
a result, the question of a probationer who actually suffers
injustice as the result of making an uninformed confession is
not addressed in this case.
The rule of Garcia is that due process does not require in
all cases that a court explain to a probationer at a probation
revocation hearing the consequences of an admission of violation before accepting such an admission. The minimum procedures that are outlined in Vickers are all that due process requires.
Kevin McIvers
11.
12.

Id., 136 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West 1970).

13. "The probation officer's report alone, if not rebutted or impeached, is a
sufficient showing to support a revocation and sentence." 67 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 136
Cal. Rptr. at 400.
14. See, e.g., id.
15. Particularly a telling urinalysis. Id. at 136, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 398.

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT-A CHILD'S ENROLLMENT
AND ATTENDANCE AT A FUNDAMENTAL SCHOOL
CANNOT BE CONDITIONED ON PARENTAL CONSENT
TO THE USE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT-Burton v.
Board of Education, 71 Cal. App. 3d 52, 139 Cal. Rptr. 383
(1977).
In 1973, the Pasadena Unified School District began to
operate, in addition to its regular schools, five fundamental
schools geared towards the promotion of discipline and academic motivation.' Admission to these schools was by special
application and long waiting lists reflected their popularity.
In early 1976, school officials mailed letters to the parents
and guardians of fundamental school students requesting written permission for school personnel to use corporal punishment
as a means of disciplining their children.' The letters stated
that the parents' consent to such disciplinary measures was a
"condition of'[the] child's continued enrollment in fundamental schools. " 3
Six parents refused to permit the exercise of corporal punishment upon their children. The school board then requested
that the parents accept the transfer of their children to other
non-fundamental sclhools within the district. Following this
request, the parents and their children (plaintiffs) brought suit
against the Pasadena City Board of Education seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the proposed transfer.4 The trial
court denied the request, and the plaintiffs sought review of the
order in the court of appeal.
Plaintiffs argued that the school board's requirement that
parents give permission to school personnel to inflict corporal
punishment as a condition of enrollment violated the rights
granted all public school parents pursuant to Education Code
1. Burton v. Board of Education, 71 Cal. App. 3d 52, 55, 139 Cal. Rptr. 383, 384
(1977). These five fundamental schools set forth their guiding principles as: "1.
Emphasis on fundamentals-reading, writing, spelling and arithmetic. 2. Classes
ability grouped. 3. Letter grades given perioidically in all basic subjects. 4. Strict
discipline maintained. Paddling and detention permitted." Id.
2. The letters requesting that the parents give their consent to corporal punishment were necessary to comply with the requirements of the Education Code. See note
5 infra.
3. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 56, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
4. Five of the adult appellants also sought to prevent the respondent Board from
using public funds to transfer any student from a public fundamental school solely on
the ground that the student's parents or guardians had refused or withdrawn the
permission in question.
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sections 49000 and 49001.' Conversely, the school board maintained that conditioning enrollment on the consent requirement was valid based on prevailing California case law, which,
it contended, established that a school board has absolute discretion in assigning students to particular schools.' Additionally, the school board argued that attendance at a public fundamental school is not a right but a privilege dependent upon
the voluntary consent of the applicants to the practices followed in these schools.'
In responding to the school board's initial contention, the
appellate court majority rejected outright, without rigorous
analysis, the proposition that California case law vested a
school board with absolute discretion in making student assignments.
Notwithstanding its apparent agreement with the proposition that attendance in a public fundamental school was not
available as a matter of right, the majority dismissed the school
board's second contention. In reaching this decision, the majority focused on the language of the pertinent sections of the
Education Code, cited by the plaintiffs.' The majority reasoned
that sections 49000 and 49001 require that written parental
approval be obtained before corporal punishment can be used
on any public school student. In support of this observation, it
stated that the legislative intent behind the code sections
clearly indicated "that every parent or guardian in every public
school should have the right to withhold consent to corporal
punishment, including the parents of those children attending
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49000 (West Special Supp. 1978) provides:
The governing board of any school district may adopt rules and regulations authorizing teachers, principals, and other certified personnel to
administer reasonable corporal or other punishment to pupils when such
action is deemed an appropriate corrective measure except and to the
extent that such action is permissible as provided in section 49001.
CAL. EDUc. CODE § 49001 (West Special Supp. 1976) provides in pertinent part:
Corporal punishment shall not be administered to a pupil without the
prior written approval of the pupil's parent or guardian. The written
approval shall be valid for the school year in which it is submitted but
may be withdrawn by the parent or guardian at any time.
6. The school board offered two cases as authority for its position. In the first,
San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d 699, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 309 (1971), the court found that in order to end racial separation a school district
can exercise the authority to assign students to particular schools. In the second,
Stratton v. Bd.of Trustees, 28 Cal. App. 3d 419, 104 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1972), the court
upheld the establishment of school attendance zones by local school boards.
7. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 57, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
8. Id. at 54-55, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
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fundamental schools."' Since the school board's administrative
regulation impaired the operation of the code, the court invalidated it, concluding that a child's enrollment in a public fundamental school cannot be conditioned on the consent of a
parent to corporal punishment.' "
Judge Ashby, in his dissent, charged that the majority had
incorrectly extended the scope of sections 49000 and 49001 to a
fundamental school's right to assign children of non-consenting
parents to other public schools within a given district. He
argued that "[n]owhere in section [49001] or any other section is there any indication of legislative intent to preclude a
school district to assign children, at the request of their parents, to a school on the basis of whether or not their parents
have consented to paddling as a form of discipline."" He added
that paddling as a method of maintaining discipline was a
cornerstone of the fundamental school system and that "[i]f
the Legislature intended to affect that concept it could easily
have made that intention clear by adding to section [49001]
the words, 'Nor may attendance at any school be conditioned
on consent to corporal punishment.' ",2 Thus, since the legislature did not expressly state that a school district could not
assign children of non-consenting parents to other schools
within the district, Judge Ashby concluded they should be allowed to do so.
The majority sharply criticized the dissent for failing to
note that section 49001 affirmatively denies the use of corporal
punishment absent consent.' 3 The majority further observed
that the legislature undoubtedly considered the problem at
issue and determined that the elimination of mandatory corporal punishment does not thwart the objective of strict discipline
in fundamental school programs. The majority reasoned that
if the legislature had intended that corporal punishment was
to be allowed in public fundamental schools, then the legislature could have easily codified that intention by providing directly in the statute that fundamental schools were excepted
from the corporal punishment requirement. Finally, as to the
dissent's contention that paddling was an essential element in
maintaining strict discipline, the majority observed that
9. Id. at 59, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
10. Id. at 58-59, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
11. Id. at 61, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 59, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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"discipline can be accomplished by other forms of punishment
such as detention, suspension, or transfer to a nonfundamental school within the district."' 4
In reaching its decision, the court in Burton v. Board of
Education established that a public school is a public school
regardless of its special format, and is consequently subject to
all the laws regulating such institutions. Thus, public fundamental schools maintaining similar policies of strict discipline
to those of the Pasadena School Board will not be able to evade
the requirement of explicit parental consent for the imposition
of corporal punishment upon a child.
Practically speaking, Burton may spell the end of corporal
punishment in public schools. The administrative difficulties
of running a classroom with some students being subject to
paddling while others are not may prove insurmountable. The
inherent unfairness involved in administering corporal punishment to some and not to others could conceivably lead to dissatisfaction among parents, a resultant withdrawal of consent
to corporal punishment by parents, and the eventual termination of corporal punishment as a viable disciplinary measure in
the fundamental school program. Thus, the appellate court's
decision could serve to significantly diminish the role of corporal punishment in the fundamental school program.
Byron K. Toma
14.

Id.

